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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the 
provisions of UCA §78-2-2(3)(j). 
IV 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. 1. Did the trial court err in as a matter of law in ruling that the "after 
acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah law? (Record at pages 726-
792) 
Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the Court may examine the 
issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baiitault v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 913 P.2d 
743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130 (Utah, 1997). However, 
this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular authority in its interpretation. 
Mathesonv. Feny. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982). 
2. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah 
law, how and when the defense may be asserted? (Record at pages 726-792) 
Standard of Review: Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the 
Court may examine the issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baiitault v. Salt Lake 
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City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130 
(Utah, 1997). However, this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular 
authority in its interpretation. Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982). 
3. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah 
law, what standard of proof a party asserting the defense must meet? (Record at pages 
726-792) 
Standard of Review: Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the 
Court may examine the issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baritault v. Salt Lake 
City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130 
(Utah, 1997). However, 
this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular authority in its interpretation. 
Matheson v. Ferrv. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982). 
4. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah 
law, what facts a party asserting the defense must prove in order to assert the defense? 
(Record at pages 726-792) 
Standard of Review: Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the 
Court may examine the issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baritault v. Salt Lake 
City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130 
(Utah, 1997). However, this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular 
authority in its interpretation. Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982). 
5. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah 
-vi-
law, what instructions must be given to a jury regarding the defense? (Record at pages 
726-792) 
Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the Court may examine the 
issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 
743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. CliftoiL 937 P.2d 130 (Utah, 1997). However, 
this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular authority in its interpretation. 
Mathesonv.Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982). 
V 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
STATUTES: 
Other than UCA §78-2-2(3)(j) that confers original jurisdiction upon this Court, 
Ms. Pett is not aware of any other Utah statutes that are applicable in this case. 
RULES: 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the Second District Court of Weber County, 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan, granting the appellee peimission to file an amended answer, 
a counterclaim and assert the affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence." Because 
no Utah court has recognized the "after acquired evidence defense", Ms. Pett is appealing 
the trial court's order permitting the appellee to assert the "after acquired evidence 
defense," asking the Utah Supreme Court to determine if the "after acquired evidence 
defense" exists under Utah law, specify under what conditions the defense may be 
asserted, specify the standard of proof necessary to establish the defense, and specify 
proper jury instructions relative to the defense, if the defense exists under Utah Law. 
B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Ms. Pett filed her Complaint in this matter on December 24, 2001, asserting four 
causes of action, i.e., Wrongful Termination of Employment, Breach of Contract, Breach 
of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress. The defendant answered Ms. Pett's Complaint on or about February 4, 2002, 
and asserted various affirmative defenses. The defendant filed an amended answer to 
Ms. Pett's Complaint on August 6, 2002, and asserted various affirmative defenses. 
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On or about April 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to file an amended 
answer to assert alleged newly-discovered counterclaims and the affirmative defense of 
"after acquired evidence," claiming that during the course of discovery, the defendant 
discovered evidence indicating and/or suggesting that Ms. Pett falsely claimed that she 
was unable to work, received disability pay, received FMLA leave, used her vacation and 
sick leave, and Ms. Pett falsely submitted medical forms to the defendant substantiating 
her medical problems, at a time when Ms. Pett was able to go to Wendover, Nevada, and 
allegedly gamble. On June 17, 2003, oral argument was held on the defendant's motion, 
and the trial court granted the defendant's motion. Judge Heffernan stated that she 
thought it would be an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. The order granting the 
appellee's motion to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims 
and affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence" was entered on July 15, 2003. Ms. 
Pett filed her Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal on August 4, 2003. Ms. Pett's Petition 
for an Interlocutory Appeal was granted on September 25, 2003. Ms. Pett filed her 
Notice of Appeal on September 29, 2003. 
C 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ms. Pett filed her Complaint in this matter on December 24, 2001, asserting 
four causes of action, i.e., Wrongful Termination of Employment, Breach of Contract, 
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. (Record at pages 1-23) 
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2. The defendant answered Ms. Pett's amended complaint and asserted the 
following defenses to Ms. Pett's Amended Complaint: 
a) Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 
b) The defendant acted in good faith and without malice; 
c) Ms. Pett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the 
exclusive provisions of UCA §34A-2-105, et. seq.; 
d) Ms. Pett's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the exclusive remedy 
provisions of UCA §34A-2-105, et seq.; 
e) Ms. Pett's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, laches and/or estoppel; 
f) Ms. Pett by her own conduct has waived or released any rights and/or is 
estopped from maintaining any action against the defendant; 
g) Unclean Hands; 
h) Ms. Pett has not been damaged in any manner that would permit recovery of 
any damages under law; 
i) Ms. Pett was an at-will employee and could be terminated for any reason; 
j) Ms. Pett's damages, if any, resulted in whole or part from her actions, 
inactions, conduct or performance; 
k) Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or an 
award of punitive damages; 
1) Ms. Pett has failed to mitigate her damages; 
m) Ms. Pett's termination was based on legitimate reasons; 
n) Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or 
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o) An award of punitive damages;l 
p) Offset; 
q) Attorney's fees pursuant to UCA §78-27-56; and, 
r) Reservation of additional affirmative defenses. 
(Record at pages 28-42) 
3. On or about April 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to file an amended 
answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense of "after 
acquired evidence/' claiming that during the course of discovery, the defendant 
discovered evidence indicating and/or suggesting that Ms. Pett falsely claimed that she 
was unable to work when in fact she was receiving disability pay, receiving FMLA leave, 
and using her vacation and sick leave, that Ms. Pett falsely submitted medical forms to 
the defendant substantiating her medical problems at a time when Ms. Pett was able to go 
to Wendover, Nevada, and allegedly gamble. (Record at pages 1447-1547) 
4. Ms. Pett filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion because 
the case was approximately eighteen months old and discovery was nearly concluded, 
Ms. Pett's medical disabilities were confirmed and diagnosed by prominent and well-
respected medical doctors, permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert 
newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense would greatly delay the trial and 
extend the time required for the trial, and because no Utah court has ever recognized 
"after acquired evidence" as a permissible defense under Utah law. Therefore, even 
1. The appellee asserts this defense twice, less than two different affirmative defenses, i.e., Eleventh 
Affirmative Defense and Fourteenth Affirmative Defense. 
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assuming that the trial court was to recognize "after acquired evidence" as a permissible 
defense under Utah law, there are no guidelines or standards for the trial court to apply in 
determining when the defense can be applied, how it may be applied, what standard of 
proof must be applied to the defense, what facts must be proven before the defense can be 
asserted, what standard of proof must be applied to the facts supporting the assertion of 
the defense before the defense can be asserted, what instructions must be given to the jury 
regarding the defense, and what standard of proof the jury must find in order to make a 
factual finding that "after acquired evidence" is applicable in a given case under the 
specific facts of that case. (Record at pages 564-620) 
5. The defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion to file an 
amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense, 
admitting that the "after acquired evidence" defense has never been recognized under 
Utah law but asserted that because the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
defense in a federal case, based on federal law, that the United States Supreme Court 
decision was binding on the states. (Record at pages 726-792) 
6. On June 17, 2003, oral argument was held on the defendant's motion, and the 
trial court granted the defendant's motion. Judge Heffernan stated that she thought it 
would be an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. (Record at pages 1153) 
7. Based on this "claimed new evidence", the defendant motioned the trial court 
for permission to file an amended answer and assert the affirmative defense of "after 
acquired evidence" and a counterclaim against Ms. Pett for fraud and/or negligent 
representation. (Record at pages 1196-1198) 
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8. The trial court's decision was reduced to writing, and on July 15, 2003, die 
trial court entered an order granting the defendant's motion. (Record at pages 1196-
1197) 
9. In the trial court's written decision, the trial court did not specify, state, 
suggest or even imply what guidelines or standards the trial court and/or the jury would 
use in determining if and when the defense can be applied, how the defense may be 
applied, what standard of proof must be met in order for the defense to apply, what facts 
must be proven and established before the defense can be asserted, what standard of 
proof must be applied to the facts supporting the assertion of the defense before the 
defense can be asserted, what instructions must be given to the jury regarding the defense, 
and what standard of proof the jury must find in order to make a factual finding that 
alleged "after acquired evidence" had been proven and established in the case. The trial 
court's written order also failed to explain its legal reasoning for permitting the appellee 
to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" in this case. (Record at pages 1153, 1196-
1197) 
10. On August 4, 2003, Ms. Pett filed a request for permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal from the July 15, 2003 Order of the trial court, permitting the 
defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and the 
affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence." (Appendix at pages 1-11) 
11. On September 25, 2003, this Court granted Ms. Pett's request to file an 
interlocutory appeal. (Record at page 1445) 
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12. On September 29, 2003, Ms. Pett filed her Notice of Appeal. (Record at 
pages 1442) 
VII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "after acquired evidence defense" is nothing more than a "Wrongful 
Termination For Free Card" for employers. It serves no valid purpose. It has no basis in 
common law or historical precedence. 
The after-acquired evidence doctrine emerged in 1988 as a complete defense in the 
Tenth Circuit's decision of Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 
(10th Cir. 1988). In the fifteen years since the "after acquired evidence defense" was first 
created by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Summers, the "after acquired evidence 
defense" has been adopted by only seven states. 
The "after acquired evidence defense" is a judicial created defense concocted by 
employers to shield them from their liability for wrongful termination of an employee. 
The "after acquired evidence defense" simply gives employers another way to 
discriminate against employees with impunity. This Court should not adopt the "after 
acquired evidence defense." 
If this Court should choose to adopt the "after acquired evidence defense", it 
should adopt only the most limited version of the defense, require the highest standard of 
proof when relying on the "after acquired evidence defense" and provide for severe 
sanctions for misuse and abuse of the defense. The misuse and abuse of the defense has 
been a source of great concern of virtually all courts adopting the "after acquired 
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evidence defense," since the defense was recognized in the federal system in McKennon 
v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). 
However, even if this Court should choose to adopt the "after acquired evidence 
defense" and make it a valid defense under Utah law, the "after acquired evidence 
defense" is not applicable to the appellee in this case given the facts of this case. In this 
case, the appellee has not, and cannot, satisfy any of the requirements specified in 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 
(1995) that must be proven before the "after acquired evidence defense" is applicable. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the defense is not applicable in this case. 
VHI 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER ACQUIRED 
EVIDENCE DEFENSE" AS A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH LAW. 
HOWEVER, SHOULD THIS COURT CHOOSE TO ADOPT THE "AFTER 
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE," IT SHOULD ADOPT ONLY THE MOST 
LIMITED VERSION OF THE DEFENSE, REQUIRE THE HIGHEST 
STANDARD OF PROOF WHEN RELYING ON THE DEFENSE AND PROVIDE 
FOR SEVERE SANCTIONS FOR MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE DEFENSE. 
NONETHELESS, IF THIS COURT CHOOSES TO RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER 
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE"AS A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH 
LAW, THE DEFENSE IS NOT APPROPRIATE OR APPLICABLE UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER ACQUIRED 
EVIDENCE DEFENSE" AND MAKE IT A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH 
LAW. 
The "after acquired evidence defense" is a judicial creation. It has no basis in 
common law or historical precedence. The "after acquired evidence defense" was created 
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by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864 
F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Subsequent to the 10th Circuit's ruling in Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., employers in wrongful termination cases immediately began going through an 
employee's life with a microscope in order to find any inadvertent misstatement or 
omission, no matter how minor or trivial, to use as a basis for a claim that the employer 
would have discharged the employee if the employer had known of the misstatement or 
omission. In such cases employers would rely on any misstatement or omission, 
irrespective if the misstatement or omission was related to the employee's job 
performance or ability to do the job for which the employee was hired. Under the new 
"after acquired evidence defense," employers received a Wrongful and Unlawful 
Termination For Free Card courtesy of the judicial system. 
The Summers, decision was initially rejected by the 8th and 11th Circuit Courts of 
Appeal. Subsequent to the U.S. Supreme Court recognizing the "after acquired defense" 
in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 
852 (1995), various federal courts have continually restricted and limited its use in the 
federal court system. See for example Welch v. Liberty Machine Works. Inc.. 23 F. 3d 
1403 (8th Cir. 1994). Several other courts have also stated their concern and displeasure 
with the defense. See Brogdon v. City of Klawock. 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997), O'Day 
v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co.. 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992). 
As the appellee correctly points out in its response to Ms. Pett's Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal, only seven state courts have recognized the "after acquired 
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evidence defense" since it was first created by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.f supra, fifteen years ago and in the eight years 
since the U.S. Supreme Court formally recognized the defense in the federal court system 
in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 
852 (1995). 
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 
1992), (reversed in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), to the extent that it barred Mrs. McKennon from any 
recovery), the district court expressed grave concerns regarding the abuse and misuse of 
the "after acquired evidence defense." The concerns expressed by the district court in 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), have 
come true in the cases in which the "after acquired evidence defense" is available. The 
district court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co., 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 
1992), expressed the concern that the "after acquired evidence defense" would be used by 
an employer to comb through "a discharged employee Js record for evidence of any and 
all representations, no matter how minor or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal 
responsibility for an otherwise impermissible discharge." Id at 608, citing Johnson v. 
Honeywell Info. Sys.. Inc.. 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6* Cir. 1992). Similar concerns about 
potential abuse of the "after-acquired evidence defense" were cited by Justice Kennedy in 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 
(1995). The court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), stated that: "The concern that employers might as a 
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routine matter undertake extensive discovery into an employee's background or 
performance on the job to resist claims under the Act is not an insubstantial one. " id at 
363. 
Virtually every court that has adopted the "after acquired evidence defense" has 
expressed concern that employers will use the defense to comb through a wrongfully 
discharged employee's record for evidence of any representations, no matter how minor 
or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for an otherwise impermissible 
discharge. In Lewis v. Fisher Service Co.. 495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998), the South 
Carolina Supreme Court addressed in some detail the abuses that could be associated with 
use of after-acquired evidence by employers in employment litigation. The South 
Carolina court stated: 
If free reign were given, then in defending breach of employment contract 
actions, less-than-principled employers (or their attorneys) may be tempted 
to 'rummage the file' in order to 'discover' any and all evidence that would 
permit them to escape liability. 
The concerns expressed by the court in Lewis v. Fisher Service Co. were similar to those 
expressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Brogdon v. City of Klawock. 930 P.2d 989 
(Alaska 1997). The court stated that: 
[a]fter-the-fact justifications should be viewed with skepticism. It might be 
appropriate to fashion a rule that no post-termination justification should 
serve to limit damages unless it is one which all reasonable employers 
would regard as mandating termination and which is, as a matter of law, 
just cause for termination. Other safeguards against after-the-fact 
pre textual justifications such as imposing a heightened burden of proof are 
also possible. 
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In O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. 
Ariz. 1992), the district court declared: 
// is feared that employers and their lawyers will scour the employee's work 
record and interview co-workers in an attempt to dig up on-the-job 
misconduct that will serve as a pretext for discharge. Or, an employer 
might ignore employee wrongdoing, but tuck away that knowledge of the 
day that a charge of discrimination is made. Finally, an employee might 
endure repeated harassment or discrimination without complaint because 
she knows her work record is not spotless. 
In this case all of the various courts' concerns regarding the abuse of the "after 
acquired evidence defense" have occurred. 
Claiming it was subpoenaing Ms. Pett's cell phone records in order to ascertain if 
Ms. Pett called her supervisor, as she claimed, the appellee then used Ms. Pett's cell 
phone records once obtained, as justification to subpoena records from various hotels in 
Wendover. (Record at 289-290, 294-295, 299-300, 324-325, 329-330, 340-335). Using 
Ms. Pett's cell phone records as justification, the appellee then subpoenaed Ms. Pett's 
Bank records. (Record at 279-284). 
Using the pretext that the appellee did not know who Ms. Pett's mortgage 
company was, the appellee unlawfully and improperly subpoenaed Ms. Pett's mortgage 
records from Fleet Mortgage Company to unlawfully and improperly obtain Ms. Pett's 
bank records from Washington Mutual Bank. (Record at 222-223). Then, using Ms. 
Pett's bank records unlawfully and improperly obtained from Washington Mutual Bank, 
the appellee used those bank records as justification to subpoena Ms. Pett's bank records 
from Zion's National Bank. (Record at 279-283). 
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In its never-ending search into Ms. Pett's personal life, the appellee subpoenaed 
Ms. Pett's brother James Pett's cell phone records. (Record at 339-340, 640-641). The 
appellee also attempted to subpoena James Pett's medical records. (Record at 284-288). 
And ignoring every court decision on the so called "after, after-acquired evidence," the 
appellee subpoenaed hotel records of a trip Ms. Pett took with her brother James and his 
two children after Ms. Pett had been terminated. (Record at pages 1766-1773). 
The appellee also subpoenaed the records of American Mortgage Company, even 
though Ms. Pett never had a mortgage with American Mortgage Company. (Appendix at 
page(s) 12-13)2. And the appellee subpoenaed Ms. Pett's employment records from 
American Greetings Corporation, even though Ms. Pett had not worked at American 
Greetings Corporation for more than fourteen years. (Record at pages 228-223). 
The appellee is engaging in the exact type of conduct prohibited by the after-
acquired evidence doctrine. In the instant matter, the appellee is not only combing "a 
discharged employee's record for evidence of any and all representations, no matter how 
minor or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for an otherwise impermissible 
discharge^ McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 
1992), citing Johnson v. Honeywell InfoT Sys.. Inc.. supra, the appellee and its counsel 
are combing through every aspect of Ms. Pett's personal life in an effort to avoid legal 
responsibility for her unlawful discharge. The incessant combing through Ms. Pett's 
personal and private life for evidence of any and all representations, no matter how minor 
2. This subpoena was submitted to the trial court for inclusion in the record on three separate occasions. 
Nonetheless, it is still not a part of the record. 
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or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for Ms. Pett's unlawful discharge is 
unjustified and prohibited under the holdings of McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. 
Co., 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), and Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys.. Inc. 
Furthermore, the appellee and its counsel are combing through Ms. Pett's personal 
and private life for evidence of any and all representations, no matter how minor or 
trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for Ms. Pett's unlawful discharge, and the 
appellee and its counsel are scouring through Ms. Pett's personal life after her discharge 
in an attempt to dredge up anything to avoid legal responsibility for the appellee's 
unlawful termination of Ms. Pett.3 Any alleged "wrongdoing" that occurs subsequent to 
the termination of an employee is irrelevant and cannot justify the assertion of the "after-
acquired evidence defense." See Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Center, 
905 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Miller v. AT&T. 83 F. Supp. 2d 700 (S.D. W. Va. 
2000); Ryder v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.. 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1995). 
In this case, the appellee has engaged in virtually every act that concerned the 
various courts with respect to abuse and misuse of the "after-acquired evidence defense." 
This case is a perfect example of how employers misuse and abuse the "after-acquired 
evidence defense," and this case is the perfect example of why this Court should remain 
among the majority of state courts that have failed to recognize or legitimize this 
draconian doctrine. 
1. The appellee has asserted that subsequent to Ms. Pett's termination she went to Las Vegas on gambling 
trips. (Record at 1452). Ms. Pett admits that subsequent to her termination she took her brother and his two 
daughters to Disneyland and that they stayed in Las Vegas on the way to Disneyland and on the way back form 
Disneyland. The appellee has unlawfully and improperly subpoenaed the records of hotels in which Ms. Pett, her 
brother and his daughters stayed during the Disneyland trip, that occurred subsequent to her wrongfiil termination. 
(Record at 1776-1773). 
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The "after acquired evidence defense" serves no valid purpose. The defense is 
simply an Unlawful and Wrongful Termination For Free Card for employers. It is 
incomprehensible that the judicial system would create a special immunity defense for 
employers that only becomes available to them after it has been conclusively estabUshed 
that they have unlawfully terminated an employee. Who ever said two wrongs do not 
make a right? 
POINT n 
SHOULD THIS COURT CHOOSE TO ADOPT THE "AFTER ACQUIRED 
EVIDENCE DEFENSE," IT SHOULD ADOPT ONLY THE MOST LIMITED 
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE, REQUIRE THE HIGHEST STANDARD OF 
PROOF WHEN RELYING ON THE DEFENSE AND PROVIDE FOR SEVERE 
SANCTIONS FOR MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE DEFENSE. 
In Lewis v. Fisher Service Co., supra, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
addressed in some detail the abuses that could be associated with use of "after-acquired 
evidence defense" by employers in employment litigation. The Lewis court declared: 
If free reign were given, then in defending breach of employment contract 
actions, less-than-principled employers (or their attorneys) may be tempted 
to 'rummage the file1 in order to 'discover' any and all evidence that would 
permit them to escape liability. 
Id. at 445. To address the dangers of allowing employers unrestricted use of after-
acquired evidence, the court imposed two limitations on use of such evidence. M. 
First, the court adopted the McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 
352, 362-363115 S.Ct 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) standard requiring the employer to 
prove that the misconduct was of "such severity that the employee in fact would have 
been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the 
discharged Id. (McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 
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130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)), quoted in Baber v. Greenville County. 488 S.E.2d 314, 320 
(S.C. 1997). Second, the Lewis court held that "this proof must be established, not by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence" Baber v. 
Greenville County, at 320. The Lewis court went on to express its belief "that these two 
limitations [would] serve to exclude doubtful or insignificant evidence of employee 
wrongdoing, while allowing evidence of very severe wrongdoing that should properly be 
considered." 
In addition to application of the McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 
352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), standard concerning the severity of 
misconduct, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard adopted by the court in Lewis 
should be adopted for consideration of after-acquired evidence if this Court chooses to 
adopt the "after-acquired evidence defense" as a valid defense under Utah law. The 
Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that justifications associated with the presentation 
of after-acquired evidence "should be viewed with skepticism." The Court has even 
suggested that "a heightened burden of proof1 might be appropriate in considering after-
acquired evidence claims by employers. Given this suggestion, as well as the skepticism 
expressed by the Court concerning after-acquired evidence claims, the imposition of a 
"clear and convincing evidence" standard to such claims would be consistent with the 




EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD CHOOSE TO RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER 
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE5' AS A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH 
LAW, IT IS NOT APPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Even if this court should choose to recognize the "after acquired evidence 
defense", the defense is not applicable given the facts of this case and, therefore, not 
available to the appellee in this case. 
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 
L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held: 
Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of 
wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity 
that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds 
alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge. 
14 at 362-363. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 
130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), and every case thereafter, where the "after acquired evidence 
defense" was allowed as a defense to an employer's wrongful termination of an 
employee, there was undisputed evidence establishing that the employee against whom 
the "after acquired evidence defense" was asserted had in fact committed some 
ccwrongdoing." 
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 
1992), (reversed in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), to the extent that it barred Mrs. McKennon from any 
recovery), Mrs. McKennon admitted that she had a duty of confidentiality as a 
confidential secretary to the staff at Banner Publishing. Mrs. McKennon also admitted 
that she breached that duty of confidentiality by copying and removing confidential 
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materials without any authorization. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. 
Supp 604, 607-608 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). The president of Banner stated in an affidavit -
that had he known of Mrs. McKennon's misconduct at any time prior to her termination, 
he would have immediately fired her. Id at 608. 
In all cases subsequent to U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), before 
an employer is permitted to rely on "after acquired evidence defense" as a defense for the 
wrongful termination of an employee, the employer must first establish that the 
employee: 1) engaged in wrongful conduct; 2) that the wrongful conduct was of such 
severity that it justified immediate termination of the employee; and 3) that the employer 
would have in fact terminated the employee for the wrongful conduct if the employer had 
known of wrongful conduct on the date the employer unlawfully terminated the 
employee. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 
130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995); Sagendirf-Teal v. County of Rensselaer. 100 F3d. (2nd Cir. 
1996) If an employer fails to prove that it would have taken a similar action on the basis 
of subsequently discovered misconduct, the employee's relief may not be limited by the 
after-acquired evidence. £e£ Ricky v. Mapco. Inc. 50 F.3d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1995). 
A* The appellee has not established any wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Pett 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot 
apply in this case. 
In order to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" an employer must 
demonstrate "that the employee has engaged in wrongdoing..." McKennon v. 
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Nashville Banner. Pub. Co., 513 US 352, 361, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). 
This case is factually different from the McKennon case or any of the other cases in 
which the "after acquired evidence defense" has been applied. In this case, there is no 
undisputed evidence that Ms. Pett engaged in any action that justified her termination 
prior to her wrongful termination for the alleged job abandonment. At the very most the 
appellee has asserted that it is entitled to file counterclaims against Ms. Pett and to assert 
the affirmative defense of "after-acquired evidence" based on the appellee's assertion 
that: 
Recently, during the course of discovery, Autoliv discovered facts 
suggesting that while Plaintiff was on short-term disability leave 
(representing to Autoliv that she was totally disabled), she was apparently 
able to travel, stand, sit and make numerous gambling trips to Wendover, 
Nevada, and other places. 
(Emphasis added). (Record at 1452), and based on the appellee's belief that: "This new 
evidence suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet 
continue receiving her full salary under Autoliv's disability policy." (Emphasis added). 
(Record at 1452). 
This new evidence suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to 
avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under Autoliv 9s 
disability policy.. (Record at page 1452). 
This new evidence suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to 
avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under Autoliv fs 
disability policy. This scheme included Plaintiff's submission offraudulent 
requests for short-term disability to Autoliv; having her physician sign 
several medical certification forms at one time, and then submitting them to 
Autoliv at various times; and, remaining on short-term disability leave for 
some period when she was able to return to work (as she has admitted under oath). 
(Record at pages 1452-1453). 
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Ms. Pett has disputed the appellee's assertions of fact, as well as the appellee's 
interpretations and conclusions regarding the alleged facts. (Record at 564-587). The 
appellee and its counsel's personal interpretations of alleged facts: 
suggesting that while Plaintiff was on short-term disability leave 
(representing to Autoliv that she was totally disabled), she was apparently 
able to travel, stand, sit and make numerous gambling trips to Wendover, 
Nevada and other places 
and the appellee and its counsel's personal interpretations that '"This new evidence 
suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue 
receiving her full salary under Autoliv 7s disability policy;" are not facts. The appellee 
and its counsel's personal interpretations of the alleged facts are not legally sufficient to 
dispute the medical examinations and diagnosis of the various doctors that examined, 
diagnosed and treated Ms. Pett and found her unable to work. Therefore, there is no 
undisputed evidence of any "wrongdoing" on Ms. Pett's part that is necessary before the 
"after acquired evidence defense" would be available to the appellee in this case. 
The "after-acquired evidence defense" has never been applied to anything but 
undisputed factual evidence. The appellee has not cited, and cannot cite this Court to any 
case where a party was entitled to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" based on a 
party's allegations that there are 'facts suggesting or evidence that "suggests" 
something. When there is a factual dispute as to whether or not an employee has engaged 
in "wrongdoing", the "after-acquired evidence" does not apply. See Glassman v. Good 
Samaritan Society. Inc.. 921 P.2d 224 (Kan. App. 1996), McKennon v. Nashville Banner. 
Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). 
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B. The appellee has not established that any alleged "wrongdoing" on the part of 
Ms, Pett was so severe that it justified immediate termination of Ms, Pett 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot 
apply in this case. 
In order to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" an employer "must 
establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee would in fact have 
been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the 
discharge. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 362-363115 S.Ct. 
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). Even assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Pett was in Wendover 
on all occasions that the appellee asserts, the appellee has not established that going to 
Wendover when an employee is unable to perform their work is "wrongdoing." The 
appellee has not, and cannot prove, that because an employee is able to sit in a chair or 
ride in an automobile, that the employee is able to work and has engaged in any 
"wrongdoing" that is of such severity that it justifies the employee's immediate 
termination. 
Every day there are people who visit Wendover to gamble, eat or just look around, 
who are in wheelchairs, on crutches, missing arms, on oxygen, and/or suffer from a 
number of other disabilities and/or problems that would prevent them from performing 
Ms. Pett's job for the appellee. The appellee cannot logically or honestly claim that those 
people are not disabled, or that those people are able to perform Ms. Pett's job for the 
appellee simply because those individuals are able to travel to Wendover and engage in 
some type of activity while there. 
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Because the "after-acquired evidence defense" can only be applied when there is 
undisputed evidence of misconduct by a party that is so severe that it would have justified 
an immediate and prior termination of that party, and because there is no evidence of any 
misconduct on the part of Ms. Pett in this case, much less undisputed evidence of 
misconduct that is so severe that it would have justified an immediate and prior 
termination of Ms. Pett, the "after-acquired evidence defense" is not available to the 
appellee in this case. 
C. The appellee has not asserted that it would have immediately terminated Ms. 
Pett had it known of Mr. Pett's alleged "wrongdoing." Therefore, as a matter 
of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot apply in this case. 
The appellee has not alleged that it would have terminated Ms. Pett's employment 
based on the alleged evidence that the appellee asserts "suggests that Plaintiff engaged in 
a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under 
Autoliv 's disability policy'' Nor has the appellee alleged that it would have terminated 
Ms. Pett's employment because, as the appellee asserts: "This new evidence suggests that 
Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue receiving her full 
salary under Autoliv Js disability policy " 
Under the "after-acquired evidence defense" a party wishing to rely on the defense 
must affirmatively assert that had it known of an employee's misconduct it would have 
terminated the employee at an earlier date. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co., 
794 F. Supp 604, 608 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), citing O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter 
Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992). Because the appellee has not asserted that 
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it would have terminated Ms. Pett's employment prior to her unlawful termination on 
April 9, 2001, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence defense" does not apply to 
this case. 
D. The appellee knew that on one occasion while Ms. Pett was on disability, and her 
foot was in a cast and she was unable to work, that Ms. Pett went to Wendover. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot apply in 
this case. 
The "after-acquired evidence defense" is not available to an employer if at the time 
the employer wrongfully terminated the employee the employer knew of the actions or 
omissions of the employee that the employer later relies on to assert the "after-acquired 
evidence defense." See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.. 959 P.2d 792, 796 
(Ariz. 1998) declaring: 
Of course, if the employee can demonstrate that the employer knew of 
misconduct and chose to ignore it, then he will defeat the employer's 
attempted use of the after-acquired evidence and defense of legal excuse. 
On one occasion while Ms. Pett was on disability, her foot in a cast and she was 
unable to work, Ms. Pett went to Wendover. While she was in Wendover sitting in a 
chair with her foot up on another chair, Ms. Pett talked with several employees of the 
appellee. In fact, Ms. Pett specifically told one of the employees to tell her supervisor, 
Gary Reevs, "Hi." The evidence in this case will show that the message was relayed to 
Reevs. Therefore, the appellee had actual knowledge that Ms. Pett had gone to 
Wendover when her foot was in a cast and she was on paid disability. 
Because the appellee knew at the time it wrongfully terminated Ms. Pett that she 
had gone to Wendover while she was on disability with her foot in a cast, the appellee is 
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estopped to claim that the "after-acquired evidence defense" is applicable in this case. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence defense" is not applicable 
given the facts of this case. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLEE HAS EITHER WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO CLAIM THAT THE 
"AFTER-ACQUIRED DEFENSE" IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, OR THE 
APPELLEE HAS ADMITTED THAT IT WRONGFULLY TERMINATED MS. 
PETT. 
The "after-acquired evidence defense" is only available to an employer after it has 
been established that the employee was wrongfully terminated. See O'Day v. McDonnell 
Douglas Helicopter Co.. 959 P.2d 792, 796-797 (Ariz. 1998). If the termination of the 
employee was justified, the "after-acquired evidence defense" is not applicable. Id. 
Therefore, by asserting that the "after-acquired evidence defense" is applicable to the 
facts of this case, the appellee has admitted that it wrongfully terminated Ms. Pett. If, on 
the other hand, the appellee wishes to assert that it properly terminated Ms. Pett for job 
abandonment, the appellee has waived any right to claim that the "after-acquired evidence 
defense" is applicable to this case, 
The Appellee cannot have it both ways. Either, the "after-acquired evidence 
defense" is not applicable to the facts of this case or the appellee is estopped to claim it 
did not wrongfully terminate Ms. Pett. Therefore, the appellee must either withdraw its 
assertion of the "after-acquired evidence defense" in this proceeding or be bound by its 
admission that it wrongfully terminated Ms. Pett. 
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IX 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Under the "after-acquired evidence defense" doctrine, a party must prove that had 
it known of an employee's misconduct it would have terminated the employee at an 
earlier date. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604, 608 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1992), citing O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co.. 784 F. Supp. 1466, 
1468 (D. Ariz. 1992). Because the appellee has not shown any "wrongdoing" on the part 
of Ms. Pett, because the appellee has not shown that any alleged "wrongdoing" was of 
such severity that it justified immediate termination of Ms. Pett at any time prior to her 
unlawful termination on April 9, 2001, and because the appellee has not asserted that it 
would have terminated Ms. Petfs employment prior to her unlawful termination on April 
9, 2001, the appellee has not satisfied the requirements necessary to assert the "after-
acquired evidence defense." Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence 
defense" cannot apply in this case. 
The appellee has not alleged that it would have terminated Ms. Pett's employment 
based on the alleged evidence that the appellee asserts "suggests that Plaintiff engaged in 
a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under 
Autoliv 's disability policy." Nor has the appellee alleged that it would have terminated 
Ms. Pett's employment because, as the appellee asserts "This scheme included Plaintiff's 
submission of fraudulent requests for short-term disability leave to Autoliv; having her 
physician sign several medical certification forms at a time and then submitting them to 
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Autoliv at various times." Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence 
defense" cannot apply in this case. 
Because the "after-acquired evidence defense" cannot apply in this case, this Court 
must remand this case back to the district court with instructions to strike the appellee's 
second amended answer, counter claim and affirmative defense of "after acquired 
evidence." 
Respectfully submitted this / day of March 2004. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Sheri Pert 
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SHERI COLLEEN PETT 
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Autoliv, Asp, Inc. 
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PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
Civil No. 010908813 
Supreme Court No. 
-oooOooo— 
(1) Sheri Pett. by and through her counsel of record Charles A. Schultz, petitions the Utah 
Supreme Court to permit an appeal from the interlocutory order of Judge Pamela Heffeman 
entered in this matter on July 15, 2003. 
(2) A copy of the order sought to be reviewed is attached to this Petition. 
(3) STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. Ms. Pett filed her complaint in this matter, asserting four causes of action, i.e.. 
Wrongful Termination of Employment, Breach of Contract Breach of Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
2. Ms. Pett subsequently dismissed her cause of action for Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, because she and her counsel believe the standard under Utah law for proving 
that cause of action is so onerous that the cause of action for all practical purposes is nonexistent. 
3. The defendant answered M. Pett's complaint and asserted the following defenses to Ms. 
Pelt's cause of action: 
a) Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 
b) The defendant acted in good faith and without malice; 
c) Ms. Pett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the 
exclusive provisions of UCA §34A-2-lG5, et. seq.; 
d) Ms. Petf s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the exclusive remedy provisions of 
UCA§34A-2-105.etseq.; 
e) Ms. Pett's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, laches and/or estoppel: 
f) Ms. Pett by her own conduct has waived or released any rights and/or is estopped 
from maintaining any action against the defendant; 
g) Unclean Hands; 
h) Ms Pett has not been damaged in any manner that would permit recover of an\ 
damages under law; 
-2-
i) Ms. Pett was an at-will employee and could be terminated for any reason; 
j) Ms. Pett's damages, if any. resulted in whole or part from her actions, inactions, 
conduct or performance; 
k) Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or an award 
of punitive damages; 
1) Ms. Pett has failed to mitigate her damages; 
m) Ms. Pett's termination was based on legitimate reasons; 
n) Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or an award 
of punitive damages; (The defendant asserts this defense twice, under two different affirmative 
defenses, i.e., Eleventh Affirmative Defense and Fourteenth Affirmative Defense). 
o) Offset: 
p) Attorney's fees pursuant to UCA §78-27-56; 
q) Reservation of additional affirmative defenses. 
4. On or about April 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to file an amended answer to 
assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence/' 
(hereinafter, "the defense"), claiming that during the course of discovery, the defendant 
discovered evidence indicating and/or suggesting that Ms. Pett falsely claimed that she was unable 
to work when in fact she was receiving disability pay, receiving FMLA leave and using her 
vacation and sick leave, that Ms. Pett falsely submitted medical forms to the defendant 
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substantiating her medical problems, when Ms. Pett was able to go to Wendover Nevada and 
allegedly gamble. 
5. Based on this claimed new evidence the defendant motioned the trial court for 
permission to file an amended answer and assert the affirmative defense of "after acquired 
evidence" and a counterclaim against Ms. Pett for fraud and/or negligent representation. 
6. Ms. Pett filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion because the case 
was approximately eighteen months old and discovery was nearly concluded, Ms. Pett's medical 
disabilities were confirmed and diagnosed by prominent and well-respected medical doctors, 
permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and 
affirmative defense would greatly delay the trial and extend the time required for the trial, and 
because no Utah court has ever recognized "after acquired evidence" as a permissible defense 
under Utah law. Therefore, even assuming that this Court was to recognize "after acquired 
evidence" as a permissible defense under Utah law, there are no guidelines or standards for the 
trial court to apply in determining when the defense can be applied, how it may be applied, what 
standard of proof must be applied to the defense, what facts must be proven before the defense 
can be asserted, what standard of proof must be applied to the facts supporting the assertion of the 
defense before the defense can be asserted, what instructions must be given to the jury regarding 
the defense, and what standard of proof the jury must find in order to make a factual finding that 
"after acquired evidence" is applicable in a given case under the specific facts of that case. A 
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copy of Ms. Pelt's Memorandum in Opposition to the defendant's motion to file an amended 
answer counterclaim and affirmative defense is attached to this Petition so show thai Ms. Pelt 
raised these issues in the trial court. 
7. The defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion to file an amended 
answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense, admitting that the ''after 
acquired evidence'* defense has never been recognized under Utah law but asserting that because 
the United States Supreme Court recognized in the defense in a federal case based on federal law 
that the United States Supreme Court decision was binding on the states. 
8. On June 17. 2003, oral argument was held on the defendant's motion, and the trial 
court granted the defendant's motion, stating that she though it would be an abuse of discretion to 
deny the motion. 
9. The trial court's decision was reduced to writing, and on July 15,2003, the trial court 
entered an order granting the defendant's motion. 
10. Ms. Pett is seeking permission to file an interlocutory appeal from the July 15, 2003 
order of the trial court, permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-
discovered counterclaims and the affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence/' 
(4) QUESTIONS OF LAW: 
A. Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination as to whether or not the 
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defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and pennissible defense under Utah law. 
B. If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and 
permissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of 
how and when the defense may be asserted. 
C) If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and 
pennissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of 
what standard of proof a party asserting the defense must meet. 
D) If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and 
permissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of 
what facts a party asserting the defense must prove in order to assert the defense. 
E) If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and 
permissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of 
what Instructions must be given to a jury regarding the defense. 
(5) IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY: Immediate appeal of the trial court's order of July 
15, 2003 order should be permitted because, so far as Ms. Pett has been able to determine, the 
assertion of the defense of "after acquired evidence" is a question of first impress jppjunder Utah 
law. Therefore, there are no standards or guidelines on if how or when the defense^Q^n be 
asserted, assuming that this Court even chooses to recognize the defense. 
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Mckennon v. Nashville Banner PubFg Co., 
513 U.S. 352 (1995), recognizing the defense, in a federal case under federal law, is not binding 
on any state courts. Therefore, unless and until the defense is recognized by this Court or the 
Utah Court of Appeals, the defense does not exist under Utah law. 
The trial court should not be permitted to allow the defendant to assert and argue a defense 
that is not recognized under Utah law. Likewise, the trial court should not be permitted to allow 
the defendant to assert and argue a defense when there are no guidelines or standards of when the 
defense can be asserted, how the defense must be asserted, what must be proven in order to 
establish the defense, what burden of proof a party asserting the defense must meet, or what 
instructions must be given a jury with regard to the assertion of the defense. The trial court has 
no idea of how to deal with any of these issues. Therefore, before trial can take place, this Court 
or the Utah Court of Appeals must first recognize the defense and then specify the proper 
standards for its application, the circumstances under which the defense may be asserted, the 
burden of proof for the defense, and the appropriate instructions to the jury regarding the defense. 
The federal cases have established a standard for the application of the defense in federal 
cases under federal law. That standard establishes a very high standard and requires proof of 
wrongdoing before the defense can be asserted. However, the trial court has chosen to ignore the 
federal standard for assertion of the defense, although apparently relying on Mckennon. supra, 
for its justification for permitting the defendant to assert the defense in this case. Under the 
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standards and requirements for an assertion of the defense established under federal law, the trial 
court could not have granted the defendant's motion to amend, file a counterclaim and assert a 
new affirmative defense. Therefore, the trial court has determined that some lower standard and 
unspecified standard, requiring only assertions of wrongdoing rather than proof of wrongdoing is 
justification for asserting the defense. Because the trial cour* has not established any standards or 
guidelines for asserting, arguing or proving the defense, this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals 
must determine what standards and guidelines apply to the defense, should the defense even be 
recognized under Utah law. Therefore, it is imperative that this Court permit Ms. Pett to file an 
interlocutory appeal seeking this Court's review of the trial court's July 15, 2003 order permitting 
the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and 
affirmative defense. 
(7) ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION: If this Court grants Ms. Pett permission to 
take an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order of July 15. 2003 permitting the defendant to 
file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense, it will 
greatly advance termination of this case. If Ms. Pett is required to proceed to trial of this case and 
the defendant is permitted to assert its defense of "after acquired evidence/' the length of the trial 
will be substantially increased, and the case will be appealed under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure at the end of any trial. Therefore, if at the end of the trial, this Court 
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ultimately rules that the defense is not applicable under Utah law or imposes as standard for 
assertion, and proof of the defense that is different from the nonexistent standard applied by the 
trial court, the trial will have been a total waste of time. 
Because the trial court has no idea, standard or guidelines on when the defense can be 
asserted, how the defense can be asserted, what the burden of proof for the defense is, what 
instructions to give the jury regarding the defense, and because the trial court has chosen to ignore 
the standards and guidelines established under federal law relative to the defense, it is a certainty 
that this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals will adopt standards and guidelines that are 
substantially different from the nonexistent standards and guideline the trial court has chosen to 
apply to the defense. 
If after trial of this case, this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals establishes standards and 
guidelines for assertion, proof and relief under the defense that are substantially different from the 
nonexistent standards and guidelines used by the trial court in the trial of this case, Ms. Pett will 
be entitled to a new trial of this case, even assuming that this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals 
determines that the defense exists under Utah law and assuming that it is further determined that 
assertion of the defense, if it is determined that the defense exists under Utah law, was 
appropriate under the facts of this case. Trial of Ms. Pett's case under the nonexistent standards 
and guidelines of the trial court would, therefore, be a waste of time for everyone. 
Because permitting Ms. Pett to file an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's July 15, 
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2003. order permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered 
counterclaims and affirmative defense, it will greatly advance tennination of this case, this Court 
should grant Ms. Pen's Petition. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of August 2003 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Sheri Pett 
-10-
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereb} certify that on the ^ ' day of August 2003.1 Hand Delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Petition to the persons at the address: 
Rick Thaler 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State St. #1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84145-1500 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Sheri Pett 
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JANET HUGIE SMITH (A3001) 
FREDERICK R. THALER (A7002) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Post Office Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc. 
IN THE SECOND D [STRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERI COLLEEN PETT, j 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. 
AUTOLIV ASP, INC., 
Defendant 
SUBPOENA FOR THE PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No.: 010908813 
Judge: Pamela G. Heffeman 
TO: Custodian of Records 
American Mortgage Co. 
1492 East Ridgeline Dr., Suite #120 
South Ogden, UT 84405 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce and permit inspection and copying of the 
following documents at the offices of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 36 South State Street, Suite 
1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on or before April 30,2003, at 9:00 sum.: 
All documents concerning, relating to or referring to Sheri Colleen Pett, 
including, but not limited to all financial records, insurance documents, mortgage 
or second mortgage documents, title policies, endorsements, title commitments, 
tax sheets, write up sheets, abstracts, trust deed order sheets from CU Platte, 
including the comprehensive file maintained on Sheri Colleen Pett, including any 
office records maintained by any or all managers, supervisors, or directors. 
In lieu of producing the originals of such documents, you may furnish complete and 
accurate copies thereof, together with an itemized statement for the reasonable cost of such 
copies, which will be paid upon receipt. 
Your rights and obligations with respect to this Subpoena are set forth in the Notice of 
Persons Served with a Subpoena, which is attached to this document. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X_ day of April, 2003. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
T 
Janet Hugie Smith 
Frederick R. Thaler 
Attorneys for Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc. 
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